The bulk of competition law enforcement is based upon a public authority investigating, prosecuting and imposing penalties on firms (or individuals) that infringe the antitrust rules. The aim of this seminar is to discuss this approach, which seems to be principally justified by recourse to the notion of deterrence.
I have selected the readings with this thinking in mind: the judgment of the EFTA Court has a concise position on procedural matters, which serves to explain the principal debate in this field. This gives us a starting point on the way competition lawyers think. Then I’ve selected a paper that explores the notion of deterrence, written by economists. This helps us to think about how easily this notion can be transposed into legal form. Then I suggested two papers that evaluate the move towards punitive forms of regulation.
The aim is to try and evaluate each paper first, before trying to map out how we can draw together the strands of discourse that come from the readings.
Case E-15/10 Posten Norge v EFTA Surveillance Authority, judgment of 18 April 2012 (paragraphs 80 to 102 only)
Buccirossi (et al) Deterrence in Competition Law (GESY Discussion Paper N.285, October 2009)
Baldwin ‘The New Punitive regulation’ (2004) 67(3) Modern Law Review 351
Parker ‘Economic Rationalities of Governance and Ambiguity in the Criminalization of Cartels’ (2012) 52(5) British Journal of Criminology 974